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Women have made progress toward closing the gender equality gap; however, there are 
still some contexts in which the law does not treat women as fairly as it treats men. One of these 
contexts is self-defense law. Traditional self-defense law is based on a male-centered idea of 
using proportional force to defend oneself in the event of an imminent threat when no other 
escape is possible. Compared to a man, a woman often has less ability to protect herself, so she 
may reasonably fear an imminent threat under different circumstances than a man. In the case of 
a battered woman, the abused may fear for her life, but may not be able to act effectively to 
escape from a violent relationship. She may also perceive an imminent threat even when her 
abuser is showing no sign of violent aggression toward her. As a result, some battered women 
preemptively kill their abusers while they are asleep or incapacitated. 
In the midst of the 1970’s feminist movement, Lenore Walker attempted to address the 
problem of domestic violence in relationships by developing the theory of Battered Woman 
Syndrome (BWS). Later, BWS expert testimony was applied to murder trials of battered women 
who killed their partners while they were not posing an imminent threat. Previously, these 
women could not have argued self-defense because traditional self-defense law did not consider 
inherent gender differences, like stature and strength, and was limited to the context of an 
imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. Battered Woman Syndrome was a crude 
attempt to accommodate battered women who kill because they perceived as “imminent” a threat 
that was not immediately present.  
Supporters of gender equality often assume that men and women are indistinguishable, 
and advocate that women should be treated the same as men. While this is an appropriate 
approach in many cases, the law cannot ignore gender differences as they relate to self-defense. 
Gender related testimony is important to explain the differences in the situation a woman faces 
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and explain why she may act differently than a reasonable person confined by traditional self-
defense law. Although Battered Woman Syndrome provides an explanation of why a battered 
woman may act in a certain manner, it is not particularly effective.  
One problem is that BWS has a very weak scientific basis, and should not be admissible 
under evidentiary admissibility standards for expert testimony. Dr. Walker’s research methods 
were problematic and her results are not consistent with her conclusions. The theory is also ripe 
with contradictions. BWS testimony generalizes that this syndrome affects all battered women 
rather than taking into account differences among women’s responses to battering.  
In addition to the faulty scientific application of this testimony, BWS also can cause 
inappropriate social and legal consequences. BWS testimony was initially an attempt to attack 
gendered notions about self-defense, but it instead increases gender stereotypes in the law. It 
Studies on jurors also indicate that it is ineffective in informing jurors about the effects of 
battering. Also, BWS creates a blurred line between a justification and excuse defense. Although 
BWS is intended to justify a killing by proving that a battered woman acted reasonably in killing, 
it also creates the abnormal pathology in that woman, which is at odds with her reasonableness. 
The focus on her altered mental state seems like an excuse defense.  
Battered Woman Syndrome is ineffective in reconciling female situation characteristics 
with the male characteristics that underlie conceptualization of self-defense law. Instead, courts 
should allow expert testimony on patterns of abuse and social agency framework to contextualize 
gender differences in physical stature and other characteristics to confront the realities of 
domestic abuse. This framework will show how a battered woman’s observations about her 
environment, her circumstances, and her social limitations to explain behaviors that are difficult 
for a non-battered person to understand. Social agency framework can apply to both women and 
  5 
men, but women are more likely to be battered. Rather than applying self-defense law uniformly 
to people from all social circumstances, social agency framework takes into account individual 
social circumstances on a case by case basis to identify why someone behaved in a certain way. 
Testimony on gender differences is inherently part of one’s situation, so gender-related 
testimony should be incorporated in this way.  
Battered Woman Syndrome is usually ineffective when the defendant uses it to claim 
perfect or imperfect self-defense in the killing of her abuser. In most cases, these women are 
convicted of murder. A verdict of perfect self-defense would mean that the battered woman who 
killed her incapacitated batterer was found innocent, and would bear no responsibility for the 
killing. A verdict of imperfect self-defense, on the other hand, would mean that the defendant 
would be held accountable for the killing, but the jury would take into consideration BWS as a 
mitigating factor.  The result in an imperfect self-defense verdict would be voluntary 
manslaughter. In the future, jurors would look at social agency framework to determine whether 
a woman’s situation rather than pathology warranted perfect or imperfect self-defense. The 
absence of pathology legitimizes its potential as a justification defense. If jurors do not believe 
the woman acted in perfect self-defense, they can claim imperfect self-defense and use her 
situation as a mitigating factor to convict her of voluntary manslaughter. 
Chapter 1 of this paper offers a broad historical overview of gender inequality in the law. 
It identifies the biological observations, societal constructions, and court cases that contributed to 
female stereotypes and their subordination under the law, including some cases that have 
increased gender rights, but that have still not provided women equal footing to men under the 
law.  
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In addition to self-defense, rape and manslaughter are areas in criminal law in which 
women face unfair hurdles to justice. In Chapter 2, how self-defense is different than rape and 
manslaughter is examined. They are unfair for different reasons than self-defense. Rape and 
manslaughter laws are problematic because of juror perceptions and stereotypes about women. In 
this paper, self-defense is the focus because social agency expert testimony is more applicable to 
explain self-defense than it would be in rape and manslaughter cases. Changing deep-rooted 
juror stereotypes about women’s behavior surrounding rape and manslaughter would be more 
difficult. 
Chapter 3 examines Dr. Lenore Walker’s theory of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).  
Walker developed this “syndrome” in order to explain the abnormal behaviors of some battered 
women, like their inability to leave an abusive relationship or their killing of their batterers while 
he is not abusive and incapacitated. She describes psychological theories like “learned 
helplessness” and the “cycle theory of violence” to give credence to her findings.  
Chapter 4 explores the scientific deficiencies inherent in BWS testimony, and why it 
should not be admissible in any jurisdiction. Chapter 5 will explain legal difficulties created by 
BWS and the tendency of BWS to support negative female stereotypes. Chapter 6 critically 
evaluates other alternatives for managing murder cases in which battered women claim self-
defense other than using BWS testimony. This chapter will also talk about the strengths and 
weaknesses of these proposals. Finally, Chapter 7 describes why social agency framework is the 
most effective way to incorporate gender differences in order to accommodate untraditional self-
defense claims by battered women.  
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Chapter 1: History of Women and the Law: A Husband Shields His Wife From Justice 
 For centuries, the law has subordinated woman. Marriage required that women give up 
their legal rights, and surrender them to their husbands. Although husbands were expected to be 
protectors of their wives, his acquisition of her legal rights often allowed his abuse of her to 
remain hidden. The institution of marriage is different today, but the law still does not offer 
perfect protection of the wife in situations in which she may be abused.  
Early Legal Theory: William Blackstone 
 Women used to be the property of their husbands, or if they were unmarried of their 
fathers.  Women could not have careers, take part in politics through voting, are make legally 
binding contracts. William Blackstone stated in his influential Commentaries on the Laws of 
England that once a woman was married, she and her husband became one person under the 
law.i Becoming one person under the law did not mean that the spouses had equal rights in a 
cooperative partnership, however. Men were the sole decision-makers and legal entities in the 
marital relationship. Blackstone called the wife’s status under marriage her coverture, which 
meant that her legal rights were combined with his, so that he had ultimate authority over all of 
their affairs.ii As a result, men could not enter into any covenants with their wives because “that 
would suppose her separate existence.iii If a woman wanted legal redress, the husband would 
have to agree to take part in the action under his name.iv Further, their unity under law prevented 
wives from testifying for or against their husbands, because a single person could not testify for 
or against his own cause.v Blackstone Commentaries also gives the husband a right to discipline 
his wife in some ways because “he is to answer for her misbehavior.”vi She is like a child. He 
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says that this discipline must be “within “reasonable bounds,” but this definition is murky and 
could lead to abuse. 
Women’s Legal Rights Regarding Protection from Abuse: A Case History Progression 
State v. Rhodes (1868) was a trial that accepted the practice of wife beating under certain 
limitations. In this case, the defendant was on trial for assault and battery against his wife.vii  The 
judge in that case believed that it was appropriate for the husband to whip his wife if the switch 
was smaller than his thumb.viii On the State’s appeal, the judge found that it would have been 
battery if the victim was not his wife, but the fact that she was his wife changed this.ix 
Perpetuating the idea that men are dominant and can harm their wives if they are angry by 
something she does. Court again believes that evil of publicity in domestic disputes does more 
harm than the acts that took place in the dispute, except when “permanent or malicious injury is 
threatened or inflicted, or the condition of the party is intolerable.”x The court states that it “will 
not interfere with family government in trifling cases.”xi Family government by definition is the 
husband, so the court chose to ignore the welfare of the wife in favor of the husband’s pride.  
This again gives the husband the right to do what he pleases because the courts are not as willing 
to protect wives. The appellate court did not necessarily accept the husband’s “rule of thumb” 
standard. The judge was more concerned with “the effect produced, not the type of instrument 
used.”xii At that time, however, the effect produced only dealt with the physical consequences, 
rather than emotional torment. 
Elizabeth M. Schneider argues that viewing woman battering as private is dangerous 
because that assumes the problem is individual and that we have no social responsibility to 
remedy it.xiii Women deny it because they have this distant vision of “the battered women,” 
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juror’s are in denial that something like that would ever happen to them.xiv Society often does not 
want to get involved, and police officers do not want to intervene in private life.xv  
Wives used to have no sexual autonomy. Sir Matthew Hale, a judge from the Seventeenth 
century, said that a husband cannot rape his wife because by marrying him she has given her 
sexual autonomy to her husband.xvi  In Frazier v. State (1905), the complainant tried to divorce 
her husband, but the court would not allow it, so they remained living in the same house in 
separate rooms. When the husband demanded sex and his wife refused, he raped her.  The court 
ruled that the husband had not raped his wife because she gave matrimonial consent when she 
entered the marriage.xvii  She also could not testify against him.  Essentially, the legal system 
failed her because she had no way of escape once the marriage started to fail because the court 
denied her of a divorce, resisted giving her sexual autonomy, and silenced her side of the story. 
The husband’s rape of his wife was not viewed as abuse at the time, but rape is a form of trauma 
regardless of whether the victim knew the person well.  
Later, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 213.1 (1980) codified the concept 
that traditionally, marriage is “blanket consent” to sex, and wife cannot escape unless she 
dissolves the marital relationship.xviii This is called the marital exemption.xix The reason the law 
upholds this idea is related to the court’s avoidance of disrupting family life.xx Modern laws are 
more sympathetic of female choice, but also uphold the idea that rape is different when 
committed by a husband rather than a stranger. This idea is unfair because a husband is capable 
of sexual abuse as well. 
In People v. Berry (1976), a man was convicted of assaulting and later killing his wife. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that he was in a state of “uncontrollable rage caused by 
provocation and flowing from a condition of diminished capacity.”xxi Berry was enraged because 
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he found out that his wife had met another man, was sexually involved with him, and wanted a 
divorce. In addition, he claimed she provoked him repeatedly with sexual taunts.   Berry wanted 
the jury to be instructed on voluntary manslaughter because of this. Voluntary manslaughter is 
defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice…upon a sudden quarrel or 
heat of passion.xxii The appellate court reversed the conviction and held that Berry was in fact 
provoked and that voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given. The court 
determined that the provocation was cumulative and reached a head when his wife started 
screaming at him right before he killed her.xxiii  In this situation, the court views her provocation 
of her husband as a justification for mitigating what would otherwise be murder down to 
manslaughter. Nevertheless, the law has been slow to recognize a similar provocation 
justification for women who kill their abusers. 
Married Women and Testimony Against Their Batterers 
 An abused wife in the past had very little opportunity to seek legal redress against her 
battering husband or to testify against him.  Wives have gained the ability to testify against their 
husbands. However, if they choose not to testify out of fear or concern for their husband, their 
out of court statements will not be heard by jurors as a result of Crawford v. Washington (2004), 
which makes inadmissible out of court testimonial hearsay statements. 
State v Hussey (1852) was a case that a husband appealed after being convicted of assault 
on his wife. In the first trial, his wife testified against him. The court on appeal ruled that 
allowing a husband and wife to testify against each other would be against public policy by 
harming the sanctity of marriage of husband and wife.xxiv Further, since the wife was under her 
husband’s coverture, she has the same legal identity as he does, which prohibits her from 
testifying. The justice who gave the opinion also worries that if husband and wife could testify 
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against each other, “it would break down the great principle of mutual confidence and 
dependence; throw open the bed-room to the gaze of the public; and spread discord and misery, 
contention and strife, where peace and concord ought to reign.”xxv The only scenario in which a 
wife has a right to testify against her husband is if he tries top commit a felony on her that would 
cause “lasting injury or great bodily harm.”xxvi In this case, the judge ruled that no lasting injury 
was inflicted. This ruling protects the husband in cases in which he may be harming his wife in 
favor of privacy, as long as the harm was not too great. A wife could have tried to seek 
protection from an abusive husband, but the judge did not value her misery as highly as her 
husband’s right to privacy or the maintenance of the marriage. He believed that her complaints 
would create more problems in the marriage and made no attempt to diffuse the abuse.  
There is also a question as to what defines lasting harm and harm that is not lasting.  
Today psychologists would acknowledge that there is lasting psychological harm that battered 
women face, which people were not aware of the time of State v. Hussey.  Charles Patrick Ewing 
argues that harm to psychological aspects of the self is just as devastating as harm to the physical 
self.xxvii  Clearly, at the time women had no legal opportunity for redress in a battering 
relationships because the law held that causing more strife in the marriage was a larger harm than 
physical or emotional harm that courts did not view as “lasting” at the time. 
Hawkins v. United States (1958) was a case in which a wife testified voluntarily against 
her husband after he transported a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for “immoral purposes.” 
Prior cases said that women could not be compelled to testify because doing so would cause 
marital disharmony. The Hawkins court noted that peace in the family would not be less 
disturbed by voluntary testimony of the wife than it is when the wife is compelled to testify.xxviii  
The court acknowledges that marriages have rough patches, which may cause a wife to wish to 
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testify against her husband, but they are not always permanent. Because of an interest in 
protecting marriage, the court would not admit the wife’s voluntary testimony against her 
husband just as it would not admit the wife’s compelled testimony against her husband. 
Trammel v. United States (1980) prohibited a husband from blocking a wife’s testimony 
against him in a court of law, which is called the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.  
This case had to do with a husband and wife who were heroin traffickers.  The husband and two 
other men were indicted for bringing heroin from Thailand and the Philippines to the United 
States. These charges were brought against them when one of the men’s wives was arrested in 
the airport after a customs check for having four ounces of heroin from Thailand on her person. 
She agreed to cooperate with the government after speaking with Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents.  The husband then tried to separate his case from the case of the other two 
men so he could try to use the privilege against adverse spousal testimony since he knew the 
government would use the wife as an adverse witness.xxix She was called as a Government 
witness and was given immunity. The court ruled that the husband’s case would not be separate 
from the other defendants and that the wife could testify about any observations or conversations 
that took place with a third person present, but not those that were confidential between the 
husband and wife.xxx  Also, the spouse who could testify is the one to make the decision about 
whether or not to testify, not the spouse being testified against.  Mr. Trammel was found guilty, 
and on appeal he said that the testimony of his wife was improper because of the precedent set by 
Hawkins v. United States (1958).  The Supreme Court disagreed.xxxi This case was an important 
step for women in that they could testify voluntarily against their husbands. 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) was a blow to the legal rights of abused women.  In this 
case, a husband stabbed another man in the presence of his wife.  The husband was upset at the 
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man because he had allegedly tried to rape his wife. During the trial, the State played a tape of a 
statement by the wife, which was taped by the police.  This was incriminating evidence against 
the husband, and led to his conviction in the crime. The Washington court at the time ruled this 
evidence was reliable, but the Supreme Court later ruled that it violated the Sixth Amendment.  
The Amendment says that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”xxxii Since the husband could not cross-examine 
the witness against him.  The significance of this case is that it now requires that all witnesses 
against someone accused of a crime must testify in a court of law and endure cross-examination 
In other words, a recorded out of court statement, however incriminating, is inadmissible 
alone.xxxiii 
The decision in this case has had a significant impact on women affected by domestic 
violence.  For whatever reason, many women who have dealt with domestic violence at the 
hands of their partners are unwilling to appear in court to testify against the partner.  The may 
still have deep feelings of love for the person, may fear him, or may simply not want to 
incriminate him. Because a number of women will not appear in court on the witness stand, and 
their recorded testimony is inadmissible in court, this has led to a number of men avoiding 
justice in these cases. Men are not being held accountable for crimes they committed, which may 
perpetuate the problems of domestic violence.  If a battering is not penalized, he is unlikely to 
learn from his actions. 
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Chapter 2: Rape, Manslaughter, and Self-Defense Law Still Subordinate Women 
 
 Women face unequal treatment in three main areas if the law: rape, manslaughter, and 
self-defense. Yet, of these three areas, self-defense is the one area that is most open to 
adjustment. In rape and manslaughter cases, the inequality of the law is imposed by the gendered 
perceptions and stereotypes of jury members. The difference in self-defense cases is that the law 
itself is what produces the inequality. Traditional law is based on a fight between two men, so it 
does not address deficiencies women face in battering situations. As self-defense law stands, 
battered woman syndrome testimony addresses battered women’s unique notions of self-defense. 
Adjusting the way jurors evaluate self-defense in relation to the differing physical capacities and 
perceptions of men and women is a more promising change than replacing common societal 
stereotypes about the genders. Socialization and cultural factors have shaped these stereotypes 
over time, and they can only be eroded with as women close the equality gap with men. 
Rape and Voluntary Manslaughter: Societal Constructions are Problematic 
Women are vulnerable in cases in which they claim to have been raped because while it 
may be simple to use DNA to prove that a man has had sexual interaction with a woman, 
prosecutors often struggle to convince jurors that the “rape” was not consensual. Prosecutors 
sometimes find it difficult to prove rape because of the hindrance of juror stereotypes about 
women who claim rape against them, which are also known as rape myths. In “Rape” in the Yale 
Law Journal, Susan Estrich describes rape in criminal law as being sexist.xxxiv She is troubled by 
the idea that rape is the only crime in which a “woman has had to resist physically in order to 
establish nonconsent,” and in which prosecutors screen cases in which the victim knew her 
attacker.xxxv  These problems suggest jurors’ perception that saying “no” is not enough of an 
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indication that a woman does no want sex.  Nor do they believe that acquaintance rape is truly 
rape. Male perceptions of rape often displace the guilt of rape onto women especially in non-
traditional rapes.xxxvi Estrich is troubled by the refusal to focus on the mentality of the male 
offender at the time of the crime, and instead focus on the behavior of the victim at the time of 
the rape.  She fears that this focuses the attention not on whether or not the man committed rape, 
but instead on whether the women resisted enough to make the offender understand her lack of 
consent.xxxvii The jury therefore is forced to look at the victim’s behavior rather than the 
defendant’s.xxxviii  
In rape cases, jurors question where the line between consensual sex and rape lies. For 
instance, it is unclear how much a woman has to fight the rape before the jury will view it as 
such. Also disturbing is that fact that males are less likely to be convicted of rape if their victims 
do not fit into conservative sex roles.xxxix  This shows the stereotype that women who are 
promiscuous are incapable of being raped because they likely brought the sexual encounter on 
themselves. In addition jurors may be less likely to find the defendant guilty if there is evidence 
that the victim has “bad character.”xl If the victim’s lifestyle was one that includes drug and 
alcohol abuse or promiscuity, jurors were less likely to convict the defendant in cases in which 
the issue on trial was whether she had consented to sex.xli 
Manslaughter is another scenario in which women are disadvantaged under the law. 
Manslaughter deals with passion killings, or killings in which people intentionally kill because 
they have been provoked to the point when they lose the ability to reason. Generally, men are 
more likely than women to lose control of their reason in the heat of passion; hence, men are also 
more likely to succeed in using provocation that results in a loss of reason as an excuse.xlii Emily 
Miller states in her article, “(Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model 
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Penal Code,” that “angry men are much more likely to behave violently than are angry 
women.”xliii Because of this, women are less likely to use a heat of passion defense successfully. 
Society still believes that males are more prone to infidelity, whereas women are expected to be 
faithful.xliv  As a result, women are not supposed to be surprised by infidelity by their husbands 
and are expected to react in a calm fashion, while men can lose control because women are 
expected to rarely commit infidelity.  Further, gender socialization has taught women to not act 
with aggression when angry, unlike men.xlv Like in rape law, juror stereotypes lead to women’s 
subordination under the law.  When a woman acts in heat of passion, if she acts like a man she is 
more likely to be found guilty of murder because society holds different expectations for the 
typical woman. Women are more likely to kill for pecuniary gain than in a heat of passion, while 
men are more likely to kill out of passion to retaliate against a woman if she leaves a 
relationship.xlvi The murders for pecuniary gain seem more calculated, while the men’s murders 
are the result of anger. As a result, a large proportion of women who kill their domestic partners 
are on death row for domestic killings, while a significantly small proportion of male domestic 
killers are on death row for domestic killings.xlvii These statistics show that the law is more 
sympathetic to men who kill in domestic relationships, reducing their convictions form murder to 
manslaughter because of provocation by their partners. On the other hand, the courts view 
domestic killings by females as cold-blooded killings, and therefore are deserving of the most 
severe punishments.xlviii  People tend to expect a woman to keep her reason when provoked when 
men reach a boiling point. In other words, in self-defense law, women are expected to act like 
men, while they are expected to vary from men in their response to provocation. It is very 
difficult for women to have a viable defense or even a mitigating circumstance because the 
standards are based on the behavior, temperament, and physical stature of men. 
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The American Law Institute created the Model Penal Code to modernize the common 
law system that was based on sexist notions that the wife was the legal property of her husband, 
and therefore her infidelity was a provocation of her killing.xlix The new law says that if a person 
can show that he acted under the influence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse,” he was not culpable for murder, but rather 
manslaughter.l Victoria Nourse argues that the nature of the relationship will determine whether 
the judge will permit the jury consider whether there is a reasonable explanation for his rage.”li 
In a scenario in which a man is insulted by his friends, judges may view the rage as irrational, 
but if insulted by a woman with whom he is in an intimate relationship, his rage may be seen as 
rational. As a result, judges’ perceptions about what is reasonable lead to unequal treatment of 
women with regard to the manslaughter mitigation. Although the American Law Institute 
intended to eliminate gender discrimination explicitly, it unwittingly solidified women’s 
inequality under the law.  
Since jurors considering the manslaughter situation must determine the state of mind of 
the killer at the time of the crime rather than whether the killer indeed committed a crime, jurors 
are free to bring in their subjective views about the reasonableness of the explanation for the 
mental disturbance.lii The stereotypes surrounding men and women play a large role in the 
unfairness between genders under the law. 
Self-Defense Problems Stem From the Law Itself 
Self-defense law also subordinates women, but is different in that the law itself was 
developed based on male on male combat and does not take into consideration the differences 
between the genders. Self-defense law was based on a one-time violent altercation that involved 
men, not women.liii  An element required to make self-defense effective, which is universal 
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across jurisdictions, is the idea that there must be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily 
injury or the person who acted in self-defense must perceive a threat.liv In addition, the force 
used in defense must be proportional, and in some jurisdictions the person will have had to try all 
other means of escape before the killing.lv Self-defense is based on male violence that which 
directed at another male with equal strength and ability.lvi  
Women who are victims of abuse by a man may feel an imminent threat earlier than a 
man might in a similar situation. Further, the type of force a woman uses in self-defense is 
usually in the form of a weapon like a gun.lvii In many cases, women kill their batterers when he 
is incapacitated or sleeping, because that is when she will not have to face the superior strength 
of her abuser.  These types of cases are the ones in which defendants use battered woman 
syndrome to explain why their actions fit into the self-defense category, although it clearly does 
not fit into traditional self-defense law.   
The outcomes in rape and manslaughter cases are largely influenced by juror stereotypes 
concerning men and women’s interactions. In self-defense cases, on the other hand, jurors make 
their decisions without taking into account the full context of the differences between men and 
women. While gender stereotypes in the law can undermine the pursuit of justice in rape and 
manslaughter cases, it is important for jurors to appreciate the gender-specific characteristics that 
lead people to perceive threats differently to consider self-defense law properly. Specifically, a 
small woman could perceive a threat of death or serious bodily injury when a larger, stronger 
male may not. Further, a woman in an abusive relationship may perceive a threat when a man 
faced with a one-time argument may not. Jurors should have evidence available to them that 
addresses gender differences, but battered woman syndrome testimony does not address these 
differences effectively. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Origin of Battered Woman Syndrome  
 Battered woman syndrome helps women who kill their abusers explain why they did so 
when he was not presenting an overt threat. The syndrome arose because of the gender gap in the 
legal standard of self-defense. Women are smaller in stature and weaker than men.  The legally 
accepted idea that one can kill an assailant in self-defense only if that assailant poses an 
imminent threat of severe bodily harm or death is not a workable standard for women. In the case 
of a battered woman who kills her partner, she may be better suited to act in self-defense when 
her husband is asleep or debilitated so that she can defend herself in a future` situation in which 
she may be harmed or killed. 
 Battered Woman Syndrome was first introduced by Doctor Lenore E. Walker in her book 
The Battered Woman. She created the syndrome after interviewing more than four hundred 
battered women and piecing together their experiences.lviii The data was from a self-volunteered 
sample rather than a random one, so rather than using statistics, she generalized to all battered 
women from commonalities she discovered from speaking to a small group of battered women.lix 
A syndrome is different than an actual psychological disorder because it is defined by a 
collection of similar symptoms with a common cause that prevents those affected from 
functioning normally.lx  
Walker wanted to dispel a number of myths about battered women by explaining why 
these women acted in a way that was at odds with the behaviors of a rational, non-battered 
person.  She also found that these bettered women tended to have low self-esteem, were 
traditionalists who grew up in families that taught them that men would care for them, tried to 
control everyone within their husband’s environments so as to ensure that he would not get 
upset, and were constantly under severe stress and fear because of their battering situation.lxi  
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Learned Helplessness 
Learned helplessness is the social learning theory that Dr. Lenore Walker uses to explain 
the woman’s inability to escape her situation because of “psychological paralysis.”lxii Sometimes 
she fears that if she tries to escape, he will kill her.  She may also feel that she has nowhere to go 
and limited support in family and friends. Women in these relationships often are defined by low 
self-esteem and depression, which can cause them to perceive that they have “little or no ability 
to affect their own lives in general or the battering in particular.lxiii 
The learned helplessness theory is supported by Martin Seligman’s experiment on 
dogs.lxiv  He restrained dogs and then shocked them while ringing a bell. This conditioned the 
dogs to associate the bell with a shock.lxv Later, Seligman put the dogs in a box that was 
separated by a fence, which the dog could easily jump over and escape from the shock.lxvi Still, 
when the formerly restrained dogs heard the bell they did not attempt to escape. Seligman 
figured that they had learned how to be helpless while they were restrained from escaping the 
shock.lxvii Walker believed that the equivalent for battered women of the electric shocks for the 
dogs were “parental and institutional conditioning” that prevented women from ending up in 
shelters or a place that would be more embarrassing.lxviii 
Walker theorizes that there are three components of learned helplessness.  One is 
information about what will happen, the second is the expectation about what will happen, and 
the third is the behavior that relate to what does happen.lxix During the second component women 
can misinterpret the kind of power they have. The mistaken idea that the battered woman’s 
response cannot influence the outcome of her situation is at the heart of learned helplessness.lxx 
After they believe that they cannot control their outcome, their inability to control it becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy because they become submissive.lxxi 
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As women continue to be battered, their motivation to respond decreases.lxxii In addition, 
she ceases to believe that she can do anything positive to improve her plight and later generalizes 
that in anything she does she will have no influence.lxxiii Finally, Walker says that the woman’s 
emotional well-being deteriorates, resulting in anxiety or depression.lxxiv 
Cycle of Violence 
 Learned helplessness explains why women believe that they have no way out of the 
abusive relationship but to kill. The next element of the theory Walker explains is how women 
know when a battering incident will happen, and therefore perceive an imminent threat. 
 Walker’s theory is based on the idea that an abusive relationship typically runs through 
three phases repeatedly in a cycle. She called these phases the cycle of abuse.  The cycle of abuse 
is made up of the tension-building phase, the acute battering phase, and the contrition phase.lxxv 
The tension-building phase is a phase in which there are increasing problems in the relationship 
that are causing stress. During this period, there are some minor instances of battering, the 
woman takes some of the responsibility for the battering, and she does everything she can to 
prevent it, without of course leaving her batterer.lxxvi In this phase the women is in denial of the 
severity of her situation, and she minimizes her partner’s actions by explaining them away.lxxvii 
This phase can last for long periods of time, often years, because of the woman’s attempts to 
prevent a brutal abuse incident and her continuous coping.lxxviii As this phase escalates into more 
violence, battered woman may try to retreat, but this causes an increase in the batterer’s 
oppression.lxxix 
The acute battering phase is one in which the tension comes to a head and the man begins 
to physically and emotionally batter his partner severely. It is usually caused by an external event 
or the batterer’s internal state, and occurs in an uncontrolled manner.lxxx Walker states that it is 
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impossible to predict when phase two begins or when it will end.lxxxi The batterer must stop of 
his own volition. By the end of the attack, both the battered woman and the batterer try to make 
excuses for the attack and ignore the seriousness of the attack.lxxxii This phase only lasts for a 
short period of time.  
The final phase, loving contrition, is defined by a break in the violence in which the 
batterer feels guilt for harming his partner, so he treats her well and assures her that he will never 
repeat his battering actions.lxxxiii The battered woman usually believes him because his loving 
behavior serves as reinforcement for staying the relationship.lxxxiv In addition, her traditional 
view of the permanency of marriage makes her fear breaking her marriage up.lxxxv  The battered 
woman is more likely to remember her husband in the light of this loving phase rather than the 
phase in which he batters her, which makes it more difficult for her to leave the situation.lxxxvi 
Walker claims that this is not the end of the violence, however.  Instead, the batterer will 
continue through he cycle once again to a more frequent and intense extent.lxxxvii  
The cycle allows the woman to learn what it feels like in the relationship when she is 
about to be beaten.  In other words, if she begins to feel tension in the relationship, she will 
recognize that the acute battering phase is soon to follow. Her heightened attentiveness to her 
abusers behaviors and cues that indicate violence is called “hypervigilance.”lxxxviii This creates 
the idea of the imminent threat in the woman’s mind. The woman will learn to become 
accustomed to this routine, believing that she has no escape but to kill him because of the onset 
of learned helplessness. 
 A woman who has killed her abuser can use BWS as a defense if her crime involved self-
defense or an impairment of reason that would cause confusion in distinguishing the difference 
between right and wrong.lxxxix It is better to argue self-defense rather than insanity, because 
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people found to be insane are institutionalized.xc It is also very rare to achieve a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity. This defense is only used in 1% of felony cases and fails 75% of the 
time.xci Further, BWS is better suited for a self-defense scenario because the syndrome tries to 
show that the battered woman was reasonable in believing that she faced an imminent threat of 
death or severe bodily harm. A battered woman would more likely like to maintain her status as 
an autonomous, sane individual and try to justify or mitigate her action with a self-defense claim.  
Ibn-Tamas v. U.S. (1979) was the first case in which battered woman syndrome 
testimony was used. Mrs. Ibn-Tamas had shot her husband in what she claimed to be self-
defense. During the first trial, the judge would not allow expert testimony on battered woman 
syndrome because it was not generally accepted in the field of psychology, and it would not help 
the jury reach a verdict because it was not new knowledge to a layperson.xcii During that trial 
Mrs. Ibn-Tamas was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, the new court did not admit 
BWS testimony, but the judge only sentenced Ibn-Tamas to two years in prison.xciii This short 
sentence may indicate that the judge had heard the testimony and considered it as mitigating 
factor in the case. 
Positive Effects of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Dr. Lenore Walker’s research on battered woman syndrome and expert testimony in 
cases in which an unprovoked woman kills her abuser has created widespread public attention. 
This attention has led to greater awareness about the problem along with increasing resources 
and strategies to remedy it.xciv Walker has written extensively about how to decrease violence in 
relationships. She talks about the effectiveness of battered women shelters, the need for equality 
between the genders, and family therapy, while also addressing the barriers to the resolution of 
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the problem.xcv Domestic violence is now a much more visible issue thanks to Dr. Walker, but 
the application of BWS in the legal system is imperfect. 
 
Chapter 4: Flaws in Walker’s Research and Admissibility of BWS Testimony 
 Battered women syndrome does not bridge the gap between psychology and law well. 
The legal system has adopted it despite the fact that the research that supports it is questionable. 
In fact, BWS should not be admissible because of the inadequacy of the research. 
Walker’s Research on Battered Women is Scientifically Invalid and Unreliable 
Dr. Lenore Walker’s research on battered women does not empirically show that battered 
woman syndrome exists because her research techniques were faulty. Doctor Walker formulated 
the Battered Woman Syndrome theory to explain how battered women are affected by abuse, 
rather than gathering evidence that proves each cycle’s existence. In fact, the battered women 
who took part in her study did not experience all three cycles.xcvi Women may experience one or 
two of the phases of the cycle, but rarely do they experience all three. Lenore Walker’s evidence 
shows that in only 65% of all cases there was a tension building phase before the acute battering 
phase, and in only 58% of all cases there was a loving contrition phase.xcvii She also provides 
evidence for each of these phases separately, which does not show that three phases exist 
together in a cycle.xcviii In fact, a much smaller percentage of these women, about 38%, will 
experience these phases together, which is clearly disputes Walker’s theory rather than supports 
it.xcix  
There was likely also experimenter bias during data collection.  The experimenters 
already knew what Walker’s hypothesis was before they interviewed the subjects, so they were 
familiar with what behaviors and feelings they should expect to be indicative of battered woman 
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syndrome.c David L. Faigman and Amy J. Wright explain in their “The Battered Woman 
Syndrome in the Age of Science” that advocates created battered woman syndrome before they 
had done research, and then tried to establish that the data they found in their research supported 
their ideas.ci They argue that experimenters should have begun their research with no 
expectations, while looking at the data from a scientific, unbiased perspective.cii Another 
possible bias that could have affected the research may have been caused by fact that all of the 
experimenters were women.ciii Staffers may have interpreted the subjects’ statements in a 
feminist way, especially because they were aware of Walker’s motives in conducting the 
experiment.civ 
Not only were Dr. Walker’s researchers aware of the desired outcome, but Walker’s 
interview techniques did not adequately disguise her hypothesis from the subjects.cv As a result, 
subjects could easily guess what results she was trying to confirm in the study and answer 
questions consistent with those results.  
Also, much of the evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome is based on self-report, which 
was collected on a self-selecting basis.cvi The people who chose to comment may not be a 
representative sample of women who are victims of battery because often women try to keep 
their plight a secret for fear of embarrassment. Further, there was not a control group of non-
battered women whose experiences would determine which factors are unique to battered 
women.cvii There is no scientific way to determine whether a woman suffers from BWS because 
it is merely a collection of psychological symptoms that might easily be feigned.  The disorder is 
not present in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), and 
therefore is not widely accepted as an existing condition.  
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The experiment’s survey format itself increased the potential for bias and error within the 
data. Survey and interview experiment formats make standardizing codes for interpretation and 
creating guidelines for analysis difficult. Having multiple interviewers will ensure that the data is 
not interpreted, recorded, and analyzed universally. Researchers were free to interpret and record 
the data they collected in interviews in any way they wanted, and did not record the subjects’ 
actual answers.cviii They lacked objective guidance and were unable to analyze answers at a later 
date because they only recorded their own interpretations of the statement rather than the 
statement itself. Despite the deficiencies of interview experiments, researchers do not have 
another option because other experiment formats are not applicable. For example an 
experimenter cannot create an ethical laboratory simulation of a battering relationship that would 
generalize well to the outside world.   
Another problem with the cycle theory is that Walker does not suggest any time frame 
during which the cycle could exist.cix This creates increased ambiguity about the cycle of 
violence, and makes it more difficult to prove the legitimacy of the syndrome testimony. The 
cycle theory also does not empirically explain the constant terror that BWS testimony often 
describes between a battering event and the woman’s response. During the cycles there are 
interim periods.cx This is a serious issue when the testimony enters the legal realm because the 
fear the battered woman feels is vital in explaining why she felt threatened. 
 Further, Walker’s theory of learned helplessness is contradictory. Seligman’s 
experiments on dogs indicate that women who suffer from learned helplessness would give up, 
and not try to escape their battering relationship, as the dogs did.cxi Conversely, battered women 
who kill their batterers clearly do not meet this classification because they are proactive in 
escaping the relationship by killing.cxii Walker’s data does not include evidence that battered 
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women in fact suffer from learned helplessness. Further, Walker did not create a control group 
with which she could compare “helpless” women.cxiii  Therefore, it would be impossible to make 
an accurate judgment as to whether a woman suffered from learned helplessness. More 
significantly, most of Walker’s subjects did not kill their batterers.cxiv Because BWS is mostly 
admissible in cases in which women kill their partners, there should have been more evidence of 
learned helplessness on those women who do in fact kill. One cannot assume that the features of 
battered women who do not kill match those of women who do kill.cxv 
Seligman’s experiment is problematic because it compared women to dogs. Seligman 
cautioned about generalizing from one species to another.cxvi  Dogs and women have very 
different cognitive abilities. Also, since dogs cannot communicate verbally with humans, 
researchers cannot determine their thought processes as we can with battered women. The dog 
experiment also cannot generalize to battered women because the methods in the experiments 
were not similar enough. The cage actually kept the dogs trapped, while the woman’s own 
perceptions relating to the effects of her abuse were what trapped her in the relationship.cxvii 
Finally, women are likely to respond differently to abuse by their husbands. Dutton 
argues that testimony should “incorporate the diverse range of traumatic reactions described in 
the psychological literature,” rather than simply using one profile to generalize across all 
women.cxviii Dutton suggests that the name “battered woman syndrome” should be changed so as 
to not give the impression that one description of the syndrome fits all.cxix  Rather, it should be 
called expert testimony on “battering and its effects.”cxx There are no ways that can universally 
measure whether or not women have BWS, which may confuse the jurors if the defense tries to 
use BWS when the defendant does not meet all of the symptoms that Lenore Walker 
describes.cxxi  
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Admissibility of Expert Testimony In General 
 
 Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 to codify rules that govern 
admissibility of evidence.cxxii Previously these rules were based on precedents of judge’s 
decisions.cxxiii First, Federal Rule 401 requires that the evidence is relevant, which means that the 
evidence presented has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”.cxxiv 
According to Federal Rule 403, the probative value of the evidence must also outweigh its 
prejudicial effects or other factors that may diminish its usefulness to the jury.cxxv Finally, 
Federal Rule 702 says that an expert can give testimony to assist the trier of fact if “(1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.”cxxvi 
 Two cases have defined the tests that determine whether expert testimony in general will 
be admitted in court. The first case was Frye v. United States (1923), which required the 
testimony of the expert to have gained general acceptance in his or her field.cxxvii Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) changed the admissibility rules in several states.  In the 
Daubert decision, Justice Blackmun said that trial judges should determine whether or not 
testimony should be admissible by looking at the “reasoning or methodology underlying the 
[expert] testimony is scientifically valid, and whether that reasoning or methodology can be 
linked to facts of the case.”cxxviii This gave the trial judge the “gatekeeping” function.  
 The Frye standard is much more stringent than the Daubert standard because it relies on 
the scientific field from which the evidence came to determine whether the evidence is 
admissible. The Frye test can eliminate a great deal of unreliable evidence that may have a 
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negative effect on the jury, but it can also be problematic in that it has the potential to eliminate 
evidence that is not generally accepted by the field that may be valuable to the outcome of the 
case. This evidence may in fact be reliable and valid, but could simply be in the midst of the time 
consuming process of gaining support in a constantly changing field. 
 Conversely, the Daubert standard broadens the possibilities of admissible evidence.  
Judges are given guidelines to determine admissibility under the Daubert standard. These 
guidelines include criteria like whether the evidence is falsifiable, or testable; whether it has been 
subjected to peer review; what kind of error rate the scientific techniques relating to the evidence 
has, or if one can determine the error rates; and finally, like the Frye standard, whether the 
evidence has been generally accepted in its field.cxxix These guidelines are not codified, meaning 
judges do not have to satisfy these criteria.cxxx Rather, they were designed for the judge’s 
convenience in helping them determine admissibility. Further, judges may only choose to use 
some of these criteria, but not all.  Some of the criteria seem to have more weight than others. 
For example, some judges may consider general admissibility within the relevant field to be 
more important than error rate information. They have the discretion to choose which criteria to 
use since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals increased their power. 
Much of the time, judges are not well versed in science, and therefore do not have the 
requisite skills to make these types of admissibility decisions.cxxxi Startlingly, most of the judges, 
96%, had not been instructed in general scientific method and principles, yet 91% believed that 
the role of judge as gatekeeper was an appropriate one.cxxxii Other survey responses indicated that 
judges did not even know what the correct scientific definition of “falsifiability” was.cxxxiii They 
also showed questionable knowledge about the other three criteria. The experimental survey on 
judges determined that they lack scientific literacy, and therefore require more judicial education 
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programs to improve their knowledge.cxxxiv Until programs are instituted that improve judges’ 
expert testimony knowledge deficiencies, the recommended Daubert criteria will not be effective 
in guiding judges to make admissibility decisions about expert testimony. 
History of Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony 
 Each state’s courts decide whether or not battered woman syndrome will be admissible in 
its state. Though no state allows BWS to be a defense in and of itself, it is often used to explain 
why women acted in self-defense.cxxxv Courts in every state to some degree have allowed BWS 
expert testimony to build a case on self-defense.cxxxvi State v. Kelly (1984) was the case that 
made BWS testimony admissible in every jurisdiction as long at it is used by the defense.cxxxvii In 
State v. Kelly, Gladys Kelly killed her husband with a pair of scissors after suffering from 
extended abuse by her husband. The question at issue in the case was whether battered woman 
syndrome was relevant to the state of mind of the defendant.cxxxviii The court ruled that it was 
because her past abuse could shed light on why she did not get out of the abusive relationship 
and why she may have felt like her life was in danger.cxxxix 
Expert testimony involving BWS is admissible if it follows all evidentiary standards and 
“when it concerns the syndrome itself, prior abuse, and the defendant's subjective fear.”cxl It is 
also admissible as long as it provides knowledge that is beyond the experience of an ordinary 
juror’s experience.cxli Some states have codified BWS admissibility in statute.cxlii Although most 
of the twelve states that have created statutes providing BWS testimony admissibility for any 
type of case, some have limited the testimony to self-defense cases.cxliii  If the prosecution has 
laid some foundation that there was abuse in the relationship, and as long as the evidence follows 
all other evidenciary rules, BWS testimony is admissible.cxliv Further, the California Supreme 
Court ruling in People v. Brown (2004) says that it only takes one abusive incident to create 
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inconsistencies in behavior, so BWS expert testimony can be used without showing that there 
has been a pattern of abuse.cxlv 
BWS Does Not Meet Frye and Daubert Standards 
Regardless of the fact that most jurisdictions accept Battered Woman Syndrome, it 
should not be admissible under evidentiary rules. The Frye standard requires that the evidence 
has achieved general acceptance from the scientific field from which it came. In the field of 
psychology, battered woman syndrome has not achieved general acceptance. Faigman and 
Wright claim that scientists have not subjected battered woman syndrome research to 
falsification attempts.cxlvi Many people have written about the flaws of BWS, but few, if any, 
have written on why the research is sound. If other psychologists have not performed tests on the 
research methods of battered woman syndrome, it is impossible to know whether the results are 
valid. One study without follow up studies is insufficient to provide conclusive results. Further, 
Walker’s results do not match the conclusions she made. These two factors make it impossible 
for BWS to be generally accepted in the field of psychology.  
There is still not clear evidence that indicates how the Daubert standard affects the 
admissibility of BWS testimony because the standard is relatively new. Texas, a Daubert state, 
does not allow it as a defense.cxlvii Texas is right to not admit battered woman syndrome 
testimony because the Daubert rule requires that the evidence is reliable and valid, and battered 
women syndrome testimony is not. The Daubert standard is only binding to federal courts, 
meaning that state courts are not required to use it.cxlviii However, if a judge were to 
systematically examine the Daubert criteria, he or she would find that BWS does not meet the 
Frye rule and would have to consider whether the other criteria are met or it they should carry 
more weight than general acceptability in the field.  
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Walker’s research may meet the standard of falsifiability, but not many people have 
tested her techniques.cxlix In order to be falsifiable, a person would have to be able to perform a 
test that would determine whether Walker’s conclusions are right or wrong. The second Daubert 
criteria examines whether the research is peer reviewed. Walker’s findings have been published 
in her own books, which are not as highly regarded as journals within the field of psychology. 
Many law reviews have also written about her research, but legal theorists are not peers in the 
field of psychology. Her methodology has been criticized widely. The judge would need to 
weigh whether the negative reviews psychology of her works outweigh the positive ones. Third, 
Battered Woman Syndrome research cannot accurately give an error rate because of the 
subjectivity of the researchers and self-selected participants. It would be very difficult to 
determine how many times she was incorrect in identifying BWS. 
 
Chapter 5: Social and Legal Consequences of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Lenore Walker’s book was written during the feminist movement in the 1970’s. It was 
effective in that it increased national attention and responses aimed at preventing domestic 
violence, but it did not diffuse unfairness between men and women in self-defense law.  Instead, 
battered woman syndrome testimony supports stereotypes of women as submissive to men, and 
detracts from their autonomy. 
 Walker theorized that women who are battered tend to take on more traditional roles, 
however, battered women in self-surveys they claim that they “present themselves as less 
traditional than a normative group of college students.”cl  She also thought that these woman 
would be more likely to feel as though they were not in control of their lives, but rather than 
external sources controlled them.  These women perceived themselves as having more control 
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that Walker had believed.cli  In addition, battered women seemed to define themselves as strong, 
rather than having low self-esteem.clii  They also suffered less depression when they remained in 
the battering relationship than if they left it, although depression did seem to be more prevalent 
in battered women.cliii On the other hand, depression is not isolated to women in battering 
relationships, and many other life events or pressures could have triggered it.cliv In other words, 
these women showed that they had an “internal locus of control and nontraditional attitudes to 
women’s roles in society.”clv Walker’s beliefs about the characteristics of battered women make 
them seem like there is something psychologically wrong with them. She thinks that a result of 
the cycle of abuse, they become passive and their own perceptions keep them in a paralyzed 
state. However, the women’s non-traditional perception of their roles indicate that they may be 
victims of other external social circumstances, rather than a mental dysfunction that traps them in 
a relationship.  
Excuse vs. Justification: State v. Norman 
Sometimes BWS expert testimony can confuse jurors when it tries to explain self-
defense, and is instead interpreted as an insanity defense.clvi  Battered Woman Syndrome seems 
to explain a woman’s loss of control or mental incapacity, which is an excuse defense rather than 
why it was justifiable for her to kill.clvii  This is closer to the insanity defense idea of an excuse, 
not a justification. It is contradictory to argue that battered women have distorted mental states, 
yet that they have an acute ability to predict harm, and therefore act reasonably when killing their 
spouse.clviii  
State v. Norman (1989) is a significant case because it dealt with a woman who shot her 
abusive husband while he was asleep and not posing any threat to her.clix The wife in this 
relationship had endured significant physical and emotional abuse due to her husband’s 
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alcoholism. During the trial, an expert witness testified, stating that the wife felt that she had no 
way of escaping, except to kill her husband. Norman was convicted, but on an appeal, the court 
ruled that she should have a new trial in which the jurors should be instructed on perfect and 
imperfect self-defense defense because of “battered wife syndrome.”clx Perfect self-defense 
would give the wife an excuse or justification for killing her husband, while imperfect self-
defense would mitigate her actions and reduce the charge to a lesser one, like manslaughter. The 
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed this decision because it did not view the killing as a way 
for the defendant to prevent imminent harm or death.clxi Justice Mitchell on the Court stated in 
his opinion that recognizing Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) would create a slippery slope 
that would potentially legalize a wife taking the law into her own hands by killing her 
husband.clxii 
State v. Norman was decided by the state courts, so it does not apply to all jurisdictions 
as a case decided by the Supreme Court would. The case also does not completely throw out the 
defense in every situation. However, this case clearly indicates that Battered Woman Syndrome 
in this jurisdiction would not be an admissible defense if it were used as a justification for what 
the abuser had done.  Battered Woman Syndrome cannot be used to further the claim of self-
defense, but is admissible defense if it is used as an excuse.  A woman who killed her abusive 
husband could use BWS in her defense if she were trying to explain her own mental infirmity at 
the time of the killing. This would resemble the insanity defense. 
Excuse and justification mean very different things in relation to BWS. Justification 
means that an action was intentional and the actor who committed the action is responsible for it, 
but he or she is justified in the act because the harm they caused prevented a greater harm.clxiii 
Excuse is different because it acknowledges the wrongfulness of the action without admitting 
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any mitigating factor, yet the person who committed the act is not responsible or accountable for 
it.clxiv  This means that something is wrong with the person, for instance a psychological state 
that is out of that person’s control, which prevented the person from distinguishing between right 
and wrong.  Battered Women Syndrome is controversial partially because it introduces the idea 
that the woman has a psychological abnormality that makes her act in a certain way, yet it seeks 
to justify her act as a reasonable person who weighed the options of harm and greater harm.  
 Anne Coughlin believes that women should retain their autonomy, which is at odds with 
BWS testimony.  BWS testimony supports a psychological deficiency, which only furthers an 
excuse claim. Coughlin believes that if decision-makers excuse women from responsibility, the 
offender becomes “less than a full human being.”clxv She prefers a law of feminist responsibility 
rather than a law that continues to subordinate them by only allowing her to escape the blame if 
she claims she has a mental disorder.clxvi BWS testimony makes women seem like they have no 
self-control and are irrational.clxvii  They seem like puppets of their husbands. Further, BWS 
testimony indicates that women do not have the capacity to abide by the law when they are 
suffering from the syndrome, and therefore supports they are not able to self-govern the way men 
are.clxviii They expect women to give up when confronted by personal issues while men are able 
to hold their own.clxix This submissiveness is at odds with most ideas about a responsible actor 
that Coughlin supports.clxx  
Coughlin says the syndrome defines women as “a collection of mental symptoms, 
motivational deficits, and behavioral abnormalities” and therefore supports the idea that women 
do not have the autonomy to escape their abusive situation.clxxi This testimony tried to give 
reasons for why women behave differently, but ultimately frame women in a way that makes 
them seem weaker then men. In discussing various views about what it means to be a responsible 
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actor, Coughlin addresses Judge Bazelon’s proposal to attribute criminal behavior to 
disadvantaged backgrounds rather than to a choice to do wrong, sometimes known as the 
disadvantaged background excuse.clxxii Morse argues that this does not give the “disadvantaged 
the autonomy or freedom to make decisions,” which further subordinates them.clxxiii This case 
draws a parallel between the poor with disadvantaged backgrounds and a battered woman with 
abuse. If a woman perceives an imminent threat while her husband is not directly attacking her, a 
woman should still take personal responsibility for killing their husband, by acknowledging that 
they made a choice to do so, rather than excusing themselves from a crime for reasons they say 
are beyond their control.  
BWS Will Only Work If a Woman “Fits” The Framework 
Only women who strictly fit the framework of BWS can argue self-defense really.clxxiv  
Women who show independence are punished, while women passive women are given an 
excuse.clxxv If a woman kills but has stood up to her husband in the past does not meet the 
standards of BWS, and will be found responsible despite the violence she endured.  Those who 
are passive may use the pathology excuse and get out of their crimes. This reinforces the idea 
that women should remain subordinated by their husbands.  Anne Coughlin calls this situation 
the “double bind” because either the battered woman is submissive and troubled by a mental 
disorder, but innocent, or independent and, but guilty and evil.clxxvi Women are changeable based 
on the power their husband has over them, but the male-centered notion of a responsible actor is 
that the person is autonomous regardless of influence. 
If defense attorneys use Battered Woman Syndrome to defend their client who has killed 
her husband, the jury has the burden of proving that that woman in fact suffered from the 
disorder. Due to the inconsistencies of behavior and symptoms of unique women and the 
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unproven elements of the disorder, it would be extremely difficult for a jury to believe that a 
woman has the disorder unless she “fits” all of the paradigm that Lenore Walker introduced.clxxvii 
The defendants must show that they have been completely passive when faced with their 
husband’s beatings in most cases.clxxviii Even if she perceived imminent danger, yet had 
previously tried to escape from the violence, the court would likely not admit evidence on 
BWS.clxxix 
Cultural stereotypes also create preconceived notions within jurors’ minds about whether 
women of different ethnicities in fact suffered from BWS.clxxx  For example, African American 
women are often seen as strong and domineering, rather than fitting into the passive paradigm 
that Walker has suggested of battered women.clxxxi Since battered woman syndrome does not 
generalize to women in all cultures, a theory that is not specific to one culture is needed. A 
theory that looks at women’s situations on an individualized, case by case basis can still address 
the realities of a woman’s circumstance that makes her act in a way that a non-battered women 
would not act. This approach will also not have to ensure that all women fit the exact criteria of 
Walker’s “battered woman.” 
A Bad Comparison 
The fact that women are viewed as unable to control their lives by escaping a man’s 
violence make women seem hopeless.  Martin Seligman’s experiment on dogs that Dr. Walker 
uses to explain the learned helplessness prong of Battered Woman Syndrome is demeaning to 
women. Walker generalizes that the effects on shocked dogs in research are similar or equivalent 
to the effects on battered women. The situations in which the dogs and women are in are not 
parallel, and women have a higher mental capacity than dogs. Therefore Martin Seligman’s 
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experiment does not provide Walker with a convincing argument.  Instead, the argument grounds 
the stereotypes of women as unable to help themselves. 
BWS Testimony’s Effects (Or Lack Thereof) on Jurors 
 Research in the late 1980’s on the effects of Battered Woman Syndrome testimony on 
jurors’ decision-making showed surprising results.  Follingstad et al. gave each participant a 
transcript of varying case facts, each involving a woman who killed her batterer.clxxxii  In the 
transcripts, the level of threat varied between low medium and high threats, and half of the 
participants were given BWS testimony, while the other half was not.clxxxiii They also limited the 
verdict options available by giving some the opportunity to choose between guilt, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, and not guilty by reason of self-defense. Then, the participants were given all 
verdict options and could choose to change their verdicts.  Half of the participants mostly those 
not provided with the not guilty by reason of self-defense verdicts, changed their minds.  The 
results of the experiment showed that the BWS testimony itself did not influence the decision of 
jurors as much as the level of threat on the woman.clxxxiv In other words, the woman was more 
likely to be found not guilty if the batterer was coming at her with a weapon rather than when he 
was asleep but had battered her earlier in the day. Battered woman syndrome testimony fail to 
help jurors frame self-defense in a different way when battered women are the defendant, unless 
the threat is imminent. In other words BWS was minimally effective in explaining why self-
defense might look different when committed by a battered woman. 
 Schuller also did a study that determined that jurors’ decisions were not influenced by 
receiving information on the effects of battering on a woman, but rather by their preexisting 
beliefs about battered women.clxxxv Mock jurors who were less informed about battered women 
were not as likely to believe the defendant’s defense.  In addition, the expert testimony did not 
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decrease the guilty verdicts, but rather increased the manslaughter verdicts as opposed to murder 
verdicts, especially among women. Overall, this experiment showed that BWS expert testimony 
did not serve an informational function.clxxxvi Further, the leniency among women when the 
expert testimony was introduced may indicate slight gender biases based on the fact that women 
are more often battered.  This may have to do with leniency based on sympathy.  
Sometimes battered woman syndrome testimony can lead to jurors having sympathy for a 
battered woman rather than helping them determine whether the woman was reasonable in her 
actions.clxxxvii Jury nullification of the judge’s instructions also may change the verdict outcomes 
in trials.  These nullifications indicate that jurors can “disregard a strict interpretation of the law 
if such an interpretation would result in an unjust verdict.”clxxxviii In an experiment, jurors who 
were given a nullification instruction and heard a BWS defense were more lenient in their 
sentencing.clxxxix The combination of the two led to leniency, not either one of the variables 
alone. It has been argued that a nullification instruction may cause jurors to act on feelings of 
sympathy for the defendant rather than their belief that she acted in a reasonable way given the 
psychological circumstances that she faced.cxc The fact that this outcome is possible “threatens 
the values embodied in the limitations of traditional self-defense doctrine.”cxci In cases in which 
battered women are the defendants for killing their husbands when he was not threatening her, 
jury nullifications happen some of the time. This might lead to the belief in juror’s minds that the 
batterer deserved to be killed, which is not a legal standard by which to find the defendant 
innocent. 
Studies Indicate That BWS is Not a Successful Defense 
A study that analyzed one hundred cases in which women killed their abusers showed 
that the majority of the cases, eighty-five, went to trial and attorneys argued that these women 
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killed their abusers in self-defense.cxcii About seventy-five percent of these women were 
convicted.  The insanity defense was only used three times.  The insanity defense is not often 
used because it is not particularly effective. 
The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women performed a trend 
analysis that did not show that BWS testimony was significantly decreasing the number of 
convictions or helping to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter, as Dr. Lenore Walker 
thought it would.cxciii Parrish compiled the results of appellate court cases, whose defendants 
were convicted at trial after using BWS in their defense.cxciv  She found that there was a 20% 
increase in affirmations of the convictions.cxcv 
 
Chapter 6: A Critical Analysis of Alternatives to Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony 
 
 Most agree that domestic violence is a terrible ordeal to have to go through. This has 
created a great deal of societal sympathy for women who kill their abusive husbands. Those who 
kill their batterers in the middle of a violent attack are protected under self-defense doctrine, 
however, others who kill their husband while they are incapacitated have a difficult time 
explaining their killings. Yet, battered woman syndrome entered the realm of the law in 
sympathy of women who had a troublesome life with their intimates, yet who still committed an 
act that is not accepted by the legal system. battered woman syndrome is not an appropriate 
defense, but it will be difficult to find a way to change the law itself, introduce new standards, or 
eliminate syndrome testimony altogether. Below are some alternatives that theorists have 
proposed. All of them are imperfect, like battered woman syndrome. 
Continue Syndrome Testimony 
  41
Nancy Wright argues in “Voice for the Voiceless: The Case of Adopting ‘Domestic 
Abuse Syndrome’ for Self-Defense Purposed for All Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill 
Their Abusers” that Battered Woman Syndrome should be extended to other victims of domestic 
violence, rather than just women. She suggests that domestic abuse defenses similar to BWS for 
adults and children should be termed “Domestic Abuse Syndrome” (DAS).cxcvi She also argues 
that DAS should be admissible as perfect self-defense.cxcvii Wright claims that even though male 
spouses are allowed to use “Battered Spouse Syndrome,” children cannot use a similar defense 
even if they are abused.  Contrary to the popular belief that her proposal will increase the number 
of controversial syndrome defenses, Wright claims that she is actually trying to decrease the 
number of syndromes, by condensing multiple syndromes into one large umbrella syndrome.  
Wright’s alternative addresses the problem of gender stereotyping because it applies the 
same syndrome evidence to all genders. In other words, she believes that all abused persons are 
prone to a syndrome like BWS, not just women. This clarifies that women are not the only 
people who suffer abuse, and there should be advocates for others, like children, who are abused. 
This testimony could also apply to adult men who are abused, although this is rare. 
Domestic Abuse Syndrome may face many of the same problems that apply to Battered 
Woman Syndrome. If DAC uses the same theory to describe why battered women behave 
differently than a reasonable man in the same situation, this theory needs to be reexamined. 
Walker’s research only considered adult female subjects who were battered. Psychologists would 
need to do more research to determine what experiences abused children and men had. Further, if 
the research related to Domestic Abuse Syndrome is the BWS research, it should not be 
admissible in a court of law because it is scientifically invalid.  
Another problem with continuing syndrome evidence is that syndromes are not defined as 
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diagnosable disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR). In other words, if a group of people displayed any cluster of the same symptoms and had 
similar backgrounds, attorneys and psychologists could determine they suffer from a syndrome. 
When a Jamaican immigrant named Colin Ferguson, opened fire on a New York train, he killed 
six people and wounded another nineteen.cxcviii At his murder trial, his attorneys tried to claim 
that he had “Black Rage Syndrome.” Ferguson’s attorneys drew on a 1968 study called “Black 
Rage” that was done by African-American psychiatrists, William Grier and Price Cobbs. They 
claimed “racism forced blacks to make certain social adaptations, becoming mistrustful and 
suspicious of outsiders.”cxcix This continuous mistreatment would lead to a boiling point that 
would result in violence.cc 
The Texas Court of Appeals in Werner v. State argued that syndromes are simply ways to 
“explain, mitigate, justify, excuse, a defendant’s criminal conduct.”cci The court was concerned 
about the danger of constructing syndromes to explain unlawful behavior.  They set up 
limitations for the use of syndrome testimony. Until syndromes are generally accepted in the 
field of psychology and appear in the DSM-IV-TR, they should not be admissible in court. 
Identify Expert Witnesses as Specialists if They Testify about BWS 
 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999) set the precedent that gatekeepers should examine the 
reliability of all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.ccii The Kumho ruling notes that 
the Daubert criteria may not be applicable in determining reliability in a situation in which the 
expert is not a scientist and the subject and issues do not relate to scientific knowledge.cciii 
However, they can be relevant to experts whose expertise comes from experience.cciv Daubert 
criteria are not limited to science, yet they should only be considered when they help address the 
reliability of a certain subject.ccv 
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If experts on BWS were classified as “specialists” rather than “scientists” they would be 
held to a lesser standard for their testimony to be admitted.ccvi This would be a dangerous 
precedent because it would allow some sciences to be classified as specialties to avoid the 
Daubert standard.  Specialists would no longer need to test their theories for validity regardless 
of testability of their research.ccvii Allowing this would permit too much invalid evidence that 
went untested. The Daubert standard is an important way to keep invalid information out of the 
courtroom. 
Reasonable Woman Standard 
 
 The reasonable woman standard will make men more empathetic to women’s values, 
create harsher consequences, and give them no excuses.ccviii  This will essentially make it illegal 
for a person to act in a way that is not in accordance with female values. This standard will 
require communicating values like “respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity” to 
juries in jury instructions so they are not “simply putting another name onto male values and 
perspectives.”ccix  In other words, proponents of this standard believe jurors must understand 
these values well so that men on the jury do not simply construct their own perspective of what 
female values are. Men have a different idea about what should be illegal and law has been based 
on the acceptability of this view.ccx  
The reasonable woman standard as it relates to killings by battered women calls for the 
admission of history of threats and violence in the relationship and expert testimony about 
typical domestic violence patterns to show the reasonableness of the woman’s fear.ccxi This 
approach would address the battering from a woman’s perspective and would therefore need to 
change the requirements of imminence and proportionality based on size and strength. The  
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Reasonable Woman standard also “hold[s] men to a standard of conduct that respects the 
physical integrity and well-being of women.”ccxii In addition to asking if the defendant’s behavior 
is in line with what a reasonable woman would have done, advocates want to determine whether 
the abuser’s violence was reasonable in response to her conduct.ccxiii Essentially they would 
judge the dead abuser under the reasonable woman standard as well.  
Changing the objective standards of self defense to meet the reasonable woman standard 
is problematic because if these objective ideas are changed to accommodate women, women 
could take advantage of this and address their problems by killing without seeking external help. 
Changing the proportionality standard is reasonable because women are not as likely to kill with 
their bare hands and usually need to use weapons. On the other hand, changing the imminence 
standard is risky. If women are legally allowed to kill before they are threatened, they might 
feign the perception of imminence and simply kill their batterer because of being fed up. This is 
not sufficient to warrant a self-defense verdict. In addition, extensive testimony about the 
patterns of violence draws attention away from the killing and toward the victim. 
Another problem with the reasonable woman standard is that it tries to address gendered 
standards that favor men with other gendered standards that favor women. Advocates of the 
reasonable woman standard claim that men mitigate their crimes by blaming women for their 
actions, however, their standard does just the opposite by blaming batterers for the woman’s 
killing rather than making her accountable.  
The Reasonable Woman Standard argues that male stereotypes in the law are harmful to 
women’s rights in the law. Ironically, the reasonable woman standard would enforce stereotypes 
of women, further increasing the gaps between men and women by diminishing men’s rights 
under the law. Advocates of this standard are angry that women have to abide by laws created 
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with men in mind, but it is also unfair if men have to abide by laws that abide by feminine 
values. 
In addition, stereotyping based on behavior of one gender does not take into account the 
idea that not all individuals that are members of their respective gender group fit into these 
stereotypes.  Many women are aggressive, violent, and do not have a high regard for human life. 
Also, many men value integrity and bodily autonomy.  Because of certain individuals that do not 
fit into gender stereotypes, it becomes difficult to determine what values encompass a reasonable 
woman, or a reasonable man for that matter. 
Anchoring the Psychological Plight of the Battered Woman in an Accepted Disorder 
Since battered woman syndrome is merely a collection of symptoms that some abused 
women share, rather than an accepted disorder in the field of psychology, it has created a great 
deal of legal controversy. BWS does not exist in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), and therefore it is not a clinical disorder that can be diagnosed. One 
option for including BWS expert testimony is by allowing it to be considered as a subcategory of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which is a diagnosable disorder in the DSM-IV.ccxiv 
Battered women often do not display symptoms that are exactly like those in PTSD.  However, 
experts who testify on battered Woman Syndrome as relating to PTSD would describe these 
women as exhibiting arousal symptoms, intrusive symptoms, and avoidance symptoms.ccxv These 
symptoms can respectively explain a woman’s hypervigilance, perception of an imminent threat, 
and their denial of how bad their situation is.ccxvi  These are all relevant explanations of why a 
woman acted differently than a non-battered adult. PTSD also offers a more objective way of 
diagnosing the disorder, through structured interviews.ccxvii 
  46
A study by Terrance and Matheson showed that when Battered Woman Syndrome 
testimony was framed as a subcategory of PTSD, it gained legitimacy among jurors.ccxviii 
Although PTSD helped obtain a more believable defense for the defendant, it also gave the jurors 
the impression that the defendant suffered from something closer to insanity rather than a 
reasonable act of self-defense.ccxix In addition, PTSD may not be able to explain certain 
behaviors by battered women because it is a more generalized disorder that can result from any 
kind of trauma.ccxx Battered women may have experiences and symptoms that are unique to 
them, and not covered in the information in the DSM-IV-TR. 
Psychological Self-Defense 
Charles Patrick Ewing believes that current self-defense law should be expanded to 
justify battered women’s killings of partners.ccxxi Self-defense law only includes threats on the 
“self” that translate only to physical threats rather than emotional ones.ccxxii Charles Patrick 
Ewing believes that battered women should be accommodated in self-defense doctrine by 
allowing them to use psychological self-defense.ccxxiii  
Charles Patrick Ewing’s argument is problematic, though.  He believes that battered 
women often do not kill because of fear of death, but rather because of fear that they will forever 
be trapped in an existence with little value and no happiness.ccxxiv According to Ewing, 
psychological self-defense should justify these women’s killings of their abusive intimates 
because it was the only way to for the abused to protect their psychological health. This is a 
problem, because then jurors will have to determine whether the batterer did in fact abuse the 
defendant.  This could be difficult if the relationship was private and no one witnessed any 
abuse.  Further, jurors would have to place themselves in the mind of the defendant to determine 
whether she perceived her life to be meaningless unless she killed her abuser. There is no 
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objective way of determining this. Ewing’s idea would create a slippery slope in which anyone 
could claim they killed because of psychological trauma, which is much more difficult to prove 
than physical abuse. It would have to rely on psychological testimony, more than witnesses that 
saw the abuse. 
Stephan J. Morse argues that psychological self-defense is incompatible with the legal 
system and is based on very “soft” empirical support. He criticizes Ewing, saying that his 
concepts of psychological problems revolve around “client-centered, and existential psychology, 
which are notoriously vague and empirically unconfirmed.”ccxxv Morse regards it as impossible to 
determine whether the person feels “an extinction of self” as well as to prove that that extinction 
of self had a causal relationship directly tied to that person’s partner.ccxxvi Also, he believes that 
this defense would be used incorrectly as an excuse rather than a justification.  He believes that if 
the battered woman was a reasonable person, she would have left the relationship, but instead 
she chose to kill her abuser.ccxxvii  Since there was clearly a reasonable alternative, Morse 
believes that using psychological self-defense would not provide a justification for the 
action.ccxxviii 
Eliminating the Imminence Requirement in Self-Defense 
 Since the idea of imminence of the threat is what is at odds with battered women who kill 
their abusers when they are asleep, one option is to eliminate the imminence requirement of 
traditional self-defense. One problem is that it must be replaced with something else, which 
could have consequences.ccxxix The concept of necessity could replace imminence.ccxxx  This is 
not guaranteed to be a better alternative to the imminence defense in the case of battered women 
who kill because the necessity defense requires that there “must have been no adequate 
alternative” to kill.ccxxxi The nature of the act of killing a sleeping batterer means that there is an 
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adequate alternative: simply leaving the situation.ccxxxii The necessity defense would only work if 
the jury were to take into account other alternatives like whether her batterer had threatened to 
kill her if she left or other responsibilities pressures like financial insecurity or having no where 
else to go.ccxxxiii Also, if the harm caused is not greater than the harm avoided, courts are still 
likely to hold women accountable for killing.ccxxxiv Another problem is that eliminating 
imminence as a standard for self-defense could translate to a much too subjective standard of 
self-defense in any type of case, not just those of battered women.ccxxxv Imminence is a key way 
of determining whether it is necessary to use deadly force because it indicates whether the 
situation is one of last resort. The necessity defense does not fit as well because it is more 
subjective than imminence, which can justify self-defense when there are other alternatives. 
 
Chapter 7: Pattern of Domestic Abuse and Social Agency Framework as a New Alternative 
 
Jurors are usually hostile to perfect self-defense or even imperfect self-defense especially 
when a battered woman kills her husband in a non-confrontational setting because of gender 
stereotypes.ccxxxvi Social agency framework should replace Battered Women Syndrome to help 
battered women reach a middle ground when faced with the “double bind” problem. Instead of 
jurors either finding them guilty of murder because they are too independent to fit into the mold 
constructed by BWS testimony or innocent, but submissive and mentally disturbed, this new 
approach would acknowledge the social situation of the battered woman and show how external 
factors help to explain why they remain in abusive partnerships. In combination with social 
agency theory, testimony should be allowed on how women can start to recognize a pattern of 
abuse through experience without the pathology and hypervigilance described by Walker. This 
concept was proposed by Robert Schopp et al.  
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Social Agency Framework  
The Social Agency Framework eliminates the need to “pathologize” the “battered 
woman’s behavior to explain her actions.ccxxxvii Schuller and Jenkins suggest that testimony could 
also focus on the “social reality of the battered woman’s situation as opposed to her 
psychological reactions to the abuse.”ccxxxviii They must identify reasons other than pathology that 
caused the woman to stay. Some obstacles for a battered woman in trying to leave are fear of the 
batterer’s domination, fear that the batterer may kill her if she leaves, lack of financial 
independence, isolation from loved ones, and a lack of police intervention.ccxxxix Instead of the 
learned helplessness idea causing the woman to stay in the situation, Stark argues that other 
impediments keep women in relationships with their batterers. Stark states that entrapment in a 
relationship is based more on factors like the “actual level of control enforced through violence, 
cultural constraints, and institutional collusion with the batterer.”ccxl 
The lack of police intervention was addressed in an experiment known as the 
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment examined police responses to domestic abuse in the 
early 1980’s.ccxli The experiment determined that arresting batterers, rather than counseling both 
the abuser and the abused, or sending the batterers away from the home temporarily, was the 
most effective way to decrease domestic violence.ccxlii Police sometimes will not make an arrest 
unless a misdemeanor was committed in front of them.ccxliii The call to make an arrest is at their 
discretion, and sometimes cops are reluctant to do so. In fact, only between ten and eighteen 
percent of batterers are arrested after police arrive on the scene of domestic abuse.ccxliv Civil 
protective orders are also minimally effective because they are not well enforced.ccxlv Daniel 
Krauss and Mark Costanzo argue that the social agency framework is a better fit for self-defense 
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trials because it does not indicate that there is something mentally wrong with the defendant, but 
that she was rational in her actions due to her unfortunate and inescapable circumstances.ccxlvi  
Pattern of Domestic Violence Rather than Syndrome as a Defense for a Battered Woman 
Who Kills 
 
Robert F. Schopp, in his “Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the 
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse,” argues that BWS is not the right way to defend 
women who have killed their spouses due to abuse.  Instead, he argues that “the evidence 
required to establish the defendant’s reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force must 
demonstrate the pattern of battering and the lack of available legal alternatives for defensive 
force.”ccxlvii  He says that BWS is used to show how it affects a woman’s judgment. The authors 
believe that it is contradictory to say that the woman acted “reasonably” in self-defense while at 
the same time her mind was impaired due to BWS.ccxlviii  The battered woman syndrome is 
irrelevant to doctrine of self-defense, but the woman’s relationship to her batterer is not.  
Women may be able to accurately predict that their husband will pose a lethal threat to 
them by observing a repeating pattern of abuse, without suffering from BWS. Imminence does 
not solely determine justification of violence.ccxlix  It is possible for defensive force to become 
immediately necessary regardless of whether that harm is imminent.ccl If someone knows that 
they will suffer harm if they do not act on their last opportunity to use defensive force, the harm 
they will suffer should not have to be imminent. Schopp argues that “imminence of harm can 
promote the underlying justifications of self-defense when it serves as a factor to be considered 
in making judgments of necessity, but it can undermine those justifications if it is accepted as an 
independent requirement in addition to necessity.”ccli  For instance, if the harm is not imminent at 
the time, the threatened party will not kill the future attacker.  However, as a result, the future 
attacker kills the innocent victim later, meaning that a greater social harm would have been 
  51
carried out.  The one who posed the initial threat would be responsible for crime, while an 
innocent person would have been killed.cclii This is different than the idea of replacing 
imminence with the necessity defense. Imminence is still a factor when applicable, but so is the 
necessity offense. 
It would be possible that his repetitive actions could clue her in to when he would behave 
incredibly violently and put her at risk.  She may recognize mannerisms or behavior that she has 
learned to associate with severe beatings. According to Schopp, this is “reasonable belief on the 
basis of her extensive experience with the batterer.”ccliii He acknowledges that in order for jurors 
to believe that the woman has used past events to have a reasonable belief that she is in harms 
way, there must be some kind of concrete evidence that the woman has been battered in the 
past.ccliv  Witnesses of the abuse, medical records, or prior law enforcement responses to 
domestic disputes may help the jurors believe there had been a pattern of abuse that would 
warrant a woman’s defensive force.  
Conclusion 
 Women faced a great deal of injustice under the law in the past due to coverture.  Their 
husbands could beat their wives if they misbehaved, and the wives could not testify against him 
in these situations. Women have made progress in the law by becoming their own legal entities, 
but they are still not treated fairly under self-defense doctrine. Battered woman syndrome was 
created as a means to incorporate gender differences that would explain why battered women 
stay in abusive relationships, and why they perceive an imminent threat and kill when their 
partner is not overtly threatening them.  Battered woman syndrome falls short because the 
research that Lenore Walker used to support is invalid and unreliable. Although many 
jurisdictions accept BWS testimony, they should not. Further, BWS testimony entrenches the 
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gender stereotypes that women are passive and helpless. This destroys feminine autonomy. BWS 
seems like an excuse because of a mental infirmity rather than a way that explains why a woman 
reasonably felt an imminent threat. Justification shows that the woman made a choice to avoid a 
greater harm, as opposed to randomly committing an act because of a mental instability. 
Testimony on social agency framework and Schopp’s idea that women act based on a pattern of 
abuse and a lack of legal alternatives addresses the realities of gender differences in self-defense 
better that BWS. 
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